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Abstract
A new way to compare the relevance of the dierent factors intervening in the occurrences
of an event is presented and developed in this paper. The idea behind the method comes from
cooperative game theory but the focus is slightly dierent because factors are not necessarily
rational decision-makers and because the only data available are obtained by repetition of
the event. The concept of relevance measure for a factor in a set of data is introduced, some
signicant examples are given and the main properties of relevance measures are dened and
studied. One of these measures, the fair measure, is proved to have interesting properties
which characterize it. Two real world situations, one about trac accidents and the other one
about mining accidents, both of them with real data, are used to show the use of relevance
measures to compare factors in each one of these events.
Keywords: Relevance measures; Decision-Making; Budget distribution.
1 Introduction
Game theory is the study of mathematical models of conict and cooperation between rational
decision-makers. In game theory, a cooperative game is a game where groups of players (coali-
tions) may enforce cooperative behavior; hence the game is a competition between coalitions of
players, rather than between individual players. Several types of solution have been analyzed
in depth; among them excel the core ([14] and [15]) as a set solution concept, and the Shap-
ley value [32] as a one-point solution concept. One-point solutions quantify how much players
should receive in dividing the spoil. For problems involving revenues (or costs) a one-point
solution assigns to each player the total amount he/she should receive (or pay) for cooperating
in the game. More particularly, one-point solutions like the power indices are used for studying
the strategic importance that players have in a committee, such as a Parliament or a stock-
holder society (see [1], [13], [25], [34], [35]). Although game theory is thought for players being
decision-makers, it is also possible to apply some of its techniques when players are not ratio-
nal decision-makers. Examples can be found, among others, in medicine ([11], [24], [26]) or in
engineering ([2], [3], [9], [12], [19]).
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The Shapley value [32] assigns to each individual the expected payo obtained as a result
of the cooperation. The approach is based on a list of reasonable properties (axioms) that a
value should fulll, and there is a unique value that meets all these properties, understanding
that the list of properties is independent, i.e., minimal. In [27] one can nd a good survey on
the transversal use of this value, since it applies to many dierent elds like medicine, reliability
or telecommunications, in which the players are, respectively, genes, components or antennas.
In particular, the Shapley value has been used in multiple regression analysis to estimate the
relative impact of the dierent predictors (see [21]).
The possibilities of exploiting in dierent ways the Shapley value can be derived by the several
axiomatizations that are available, each based on a dierent set of properties; it is also possible
to consider that some interesting methods for sharing a prot or a cost, or for evaluating the
role of the agents in a complex system, based on assumptions which do not use requirements of
cooperative games, often result in the Shapley value of a suitable cooperative game. For instance,
in [22] the authors say that \The Shapley value presents each participant's input in the game
over all possible combinations of players - in the case of regression, these are the independent
variables used in tting the data by the model. The predictors can be interpreted as players
- representative of the real players, respondents - whose opinions constitute the observations.
The respondents - via the predictors - dene the results of the arbitration, or contribution of
the regressors in the quality of the model ".We can mention also the Baker-Thompson rule that
coincides with the Shapley value of the airport game (see [23] and [10]) or the fuzzy Choquet
integral in decision making and the \lower entropy" approach in information theory that coincide
with the Shapley value of a suitable game. The Shapley value was used in marketing decision
analysis for estimating the inuence of key drivers on customer satisfaction and the strength of
the items in covering the maximum number of consumers (see [7], [6], and [20]).
In this paper we present a dierent and novel use of cooperative games whose aim is to obtain
a direct measure of the importance of the factors contributing in the occurrence of an event.
As, in our approach, factors are not necessarily rational decision-makers, we will propose a close
model gathered in the notion of incidence function instead of that of characteristic function
of cooperative game, and the relevance measures for factors instead of values for players. The
events that can be analyzed with the proposed methodology include the analysis of factors in
trac accidents, in mining accidents, quality control analysis, diseases, etc.
We assume that the information available is the data obtained from the dierent repetitions
of the event in the period under analysis, and a set of pre{selected factors that may intervene
in its occurrence. From these data an incidence function a is dened. This incidence function
associates to each subset of factors the number of times that these (and only these) factors
were present in the occurrence of the event. Thus, the incidence function a encapsulates all
the collected information on the event by assigning to each subset of factors the number of
occurrences of the event in which precisely all these factors intervened.
It should be claried that in our approach we are making three basic assumptions. First
of all, we assume that no other information on the event, apart of the incidence function a, is
available. Secondly, we suppose that the pre{selected factors are either clearly known or are
assumed to be those identied as such by experts on each given event under study. Finally,
the factors are assumed to be mutually independent, although in some cases this could not be
totally true.
Once the incidence function a is obtained, the following step is to dene an adequate measure
to evaluate the relevance of each factor in a. Given an incidence function a, a relevance measure
assigns a real number to each factor, stressing its level of importance in a. Among the relevance
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measures we highlight one of them, the fair measure, for which we give a sound axiomatic
foundation.
The relevance measures we propose for quantifying the importance of each factor can be used
for dierent purposes such as: a budget distribution for improving the future occurrences of the
event, a test for checking if previous policies were eective, or a preliminary study for performing
subsequent complementary studies when some exogenous information not encapsulated in the
incidence function a is available.
In the next subsection we introduce a simple but motivating example for a standard eco-
nomical/university event: the distribution of a budget among researchers as a function of their
past but immediate publication productivity. This is the only example we deal with in which
factors are people. The section nishes by formally introducing the notion of incidence function.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the notion of relevance measure is
introduced and a theoretical foundation is incorporated by means of some desirable properties
that reinforce or weaken the measures presented. By using this methodology, one of them,
the fair measure, is highlighted. Section 3 is focused on the fair relevance measure where two
axiomatic characterizations are provided and a link with a well{known solution in cooperative
games, the Shapley value, is provided. Section 4 treats two case studies by using real data
involving accidents in road trac and mining, respectively. Some nal considerations conclude
the paper.
1.1 The publication incidence function
To better motivate the utility of the tools, in this subsection we expose the example of the event
of evaluating the scientic production in a university department (other examples can be found
in [4]).
Periodically, a small university department shares a fraction of its resources among the
members that have done scientic research in a xed previous period of time according to their
paper authorship in specialized journals. More precisely: if N is the set of researchers of the
department then the total publication number a(S) is assigned to each subset S  N quantifying
the papers coauthored by the members of S and published within the given period (e.g., a(S)
is the number of papers in journals appearing in the Journal Citation Reports of a given year).
Once the function a is determined, we want to look for reasonable ways to assess funds to the
dierent members of the department. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the department
has only four members, three senior researchers r, s and t, and a young researcher y, so that
N = fr; s; t; yg. Assume, further, that the possible policies of the department are represented in
the following scenarios, and assume that coauthorship with outsiders of the department is not
taken into account:
1. Each published paper is rewarded equally and the spoil is equally divided among its au-
thors.
2. Coauthorship within members of the department is stimulated and the spoil per paper is
divided among authors equally.
3. Publication is encouraged for the young researcher, no matter the number of coauthors for
her publications, and coauthorship with the young researcher is stimulated for the senior
researchers.
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Assume that the incidence function is:
a(r) = 10; a(s) = 6; a(t) = 2;
a(rs) = 0; a(rt) = 2; a(st) = 2; a(sy) = 1; a(ty) = 3;
a(sty) = 3;
a(others) = 0:
From these data it may be observed that the three senior researchers are authors or coauthors
in 12 papers each, while the young researcher is coauthor in 7 papers. The number of papers
published by the department in the analyzed period is 29. Researcher r is by far the one
who more contributed since he is the sole author of most of his publications. Researcher t is
considerably less active in publishing papers alone or with department outsiders, but she is the
most cooperative senior researcher over the other two. Researcher s plays an intermediate role.
 Scenario 1
We agree to score each published paper by 1, and equally dividing the score among the authors
of the paper. Thus, the measure we are seeking is nothing else that:
Fi(a) =
X
SN :i2S
a(S)
jSj ; i 2 N
which in our particular case gives:
F(a) = (11; 8:5; 6:5; 3)
and therefore the budget would be divided proportionally to these weights.
 Scenario 2
We may also consider a modied scheme for evaluating coauthored papers that provides incen-
tives to collaboration among researchers. The score received by the authors of a paper is still
equally divided among them, but now the score assigned to joint papers linearly increases with
the number of coauthors. Indeed, this is a way to stimulate co-authorship within members of
the group. Assume that an article with a single author is scored by 1 and that an extra score of
 is added to the papers for each additional author after the rst one, i.e., the weights assigned
to papers with 1, 2, 3 and 4 authors are 1; 1 + ; 1 + 2 and 1 + 3, respectively. Then the
measure is:
Si(a) =
X
SN :i2S
a(S)(1 + (jSj   1))
jSj ; i 2 N
Let us consider in our example  = 0:5, so that the weights are 1, 1:5, 2, and 2:5 for papers of
1, 2, 3, and 4 authors respectively. The measure gives:
S(a) = (11:5; 10:25; 9:25; 5):
The values obtained indicate the proportional scale to divide the budget among individuals
according to the second criterion.
Consider now  = 1, in which case the weights assigned to papers with 1, 2, 3, or 4 authors
are 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. The measure gives:
~S(a) = (12; 12; 12; 7)
which reects the number of papers published by each author, independently of coauthorship.
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We may consider also a modied scheme for evaluating coauthored papers that provides
strong incentives for collaboration only among two researchers, i.e. the weight is 2 for papers
with 2 authors and 1 in the other cases; the measure results to be:
Si(a) =
X
SN :i2S;jSj6=2
a(S)
jSj +
X
SN :i2S;jSj=2
a(S); i 2 N
which gives
S(a) = (12; 10; 13; 5)
 Scenario 3
The criterion now does not treat symmetrically the seniors researchers when compared with
the young researcher. All the publications by the young researcher are scored 1 for her, no
matter the number of authors. Senior researchers are treated equally by the measure; for them
the weights are 1=jSj whenever the publication has not the young researcher as coauthor, but
the weights are 1=(jSj   1) if the young researcher is coauthor. That is, the senior researchers
receive a better treatment by the measure if they cooperate with the young researcher. Then
the measure is dened as follows:
Pi(a) =
8>><>>:
P
SN :i2S;y=2S
a(S)
jSj +
P
SN :i;y2S
a(S)
jSj   1 ; if i is a senior researcherP
SN :i2S a(S); if i is the young researcher
; i 2 N
which gives
P(a) = (11; 9:5; 8:5; 7):
Therefore the way to proportionally divide the budget according to the third criterion, which is
by far the most benecial for the young researcher.
To compare how the researchers are valuated by the previous measures we may refer to Table 1:
r s t y
F=29 0.379 0.293 0.224 0.103
S=36 0.319 0.285 0.257 0.139
~S=43 0.279 0.279 0.279 0.163
S=40 0.300 0.250 0.325 0.125
P=36 0.306 0.264 0.236 0.194
Table 1: Normalized measures for the researchers
It is easy to see from Table 1 that F penalizes the young researcher y, who is favored by P. On
the other hand, F is the best option for r and s, while t would prefer S. Finally we may remark
that s could be quite indierent among the ve measures.
1.2 Theoretical methodology
Let P be an event and N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be a selected set of signicant independent factors1
intervening in its occurrences. In this context, an incidence function on N is a function a : 2N !
1Factors should be interpreted in a broad sense, as for example components in a reliability system
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R such that a(;) = 0:2 Once the period of analysis of P is established, the incidence function
a assigns to any subset S of N (S 6= ;) the number of occurrences of P in which all the factors
in S intervened, but none of the factors in N n S. The data collected in each period of analysis
generate the corresponding incidence function.
Note that, although usually the values a(S) are represented by integer non-negative numbers,
we also allow real non-negative values for the incidence functions. Due to this observation an
incidence function is a cooperative game with non-negative images for the set of factors S, for
which the set N are independent factors instead of decision-makers. Contrarily to what occurs
in cooperative game theory, the function a by its nature fails to fulll some properties promoting
cooperation among decision-makers as monotonicity, convexity or superadditivity.3
For every nite set of factors N , we denote by AN the class of all incidence functions on N .
In the set AN , we can dene two natural operations, the sum and the product for a non-negative
real number, which give new incidence functions:
 If a1, a2 2 AN :
(a1 + a2)(S) = a1(S) + a2(S) for every set of factors S  N .
 If a 2 AN and k 2 R:
(ka)(S) = k  a(S) for every set of factors S  N .
The set AN with these operations has the structure of a cone in R2N 1 with the null incidence
function  dened by (S) = 0 for all set of factors S  N as proper zero element in AN . The
cone AN is generated by the vectors associated to the incidence functions aS 2 AN given by
aS(R) =
8<:
0 if R 6= S
1 if R = S
; for all S  N;S 6= ; (1)
Consequently, using the above introduced operations, we can now write any a 2 AN as
a =
X
SN : S 6=;
a(S)  aS
Finally, given an incidence function a 2 AN , we will sometimes consider the total number of
occurrences of P in that period of time:
T (a) =
X
SN
a(S)
2 Relevance measures
This section is divided into two subsections. In the rst one we dene the concept of relevance
measure and show some examples. In particular, we introduce a very intuitive relevance measure:
the fair measure. In the second subsection we dene some properties that can be veried for a
relevance measure and establish some relations among them.
2We exclude that there exist situations that involve no factor.
3We will consider these properties later on.
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2.1 Denition and examples
A relevance measure provides an evaluation on how signicant a factor is for an event described
only by an incidence function.
Denition 2.1 Relevance measure
A relevance measure is a function f : AN ! RN that assigns to every incidence function, a, the
vector (f1(a); f2(a); : : : ; fn(a)) where the non-negative real number fi(a); i 2 N is interpreted as
the importance of factor i in the event associated to the incidence function a.
Dierent relevance measures can be dened on an incidence function a. We want to point
out that the examples of relevance measures we are going to show are quite natural in the sense
that someone not necessarily trained in the design of measures might consider them intuitively
as natural measures for evaluating the signicance of factors in events described by incidence
functions.
In what follows let a 2 AN be any incidence function and i 2 N any factor.
Example 2.2 The egalitarian measure e
ei(a) = T (a)=n
The egalitarian measure assigns the same value to all factors, independently of the frequencies
with which they appear. It is a solidarity measure.
Example 2.3 The basic measure b
bi(a) =
X
SN : i2S
a(S)
The basic measure is the second one proposed in scenario 2 in Subsection 1.1. This measure
seems very natural when we suppose that any factor is able to generate the outcome even
independently from the others.
Example 2.4 The fair measure F
Fi(a) =
X
SN : i2S
a(S)
jSj
The fair measure is the one proposed in scenario 1 in Subsection 1.1. This is the natural measure
to be chosen if all factors in each set are supposed to have the same a priori weight and each
occurrence of the event is treated equally.
Example 2.5 The weighted measures bc
bci (a) =
X
SN : i2S
a(S)c(i; S)
where c : N  2N ! R is a function which allows to weight subsets in a dierent way for any
i 2 N .
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The basic and the fair measures are particular cases of these measures when c(i; S) = 1 and
c(i; S) =
1
jSj , respectively, for any i 2 N . As we shall see, all the measures considered in
Subsection 1.1 are of this kind.
Example 2.6 The selective measures s
si (a) =
X
SN : i=(S)
a(S)
where  is a selection function,  : 2N ! N , with (S) 2 S for all S 6= ;.
This measure seems very natural when for each set of factors S we are able to assign the whole
importance to just one factor, namely (S). In a sense the other factors in S, if any, are
depending on (S).
Notice that a selective measure can also be viewed as a weighted measure in which the
weights are dened by
c(i; S) =

1 if i = (S)
0 otherwise
Example 2.7 The proportional measure p
pi(a) =
T (a)
nP
j=1
a(fjg)
 a(fig)
The proportional measure is well{dened if in at least one occurrence of the event only a single
factor appeared. This measure seems very natural when we are not sure that when a occurrence
involves more than one factor all the factors are really eective; we may think to a road accident
that involves a driver with serious damages on a car in bad condition, but we are not able to
say if these negative elements where already present before the accident, so that they are the
eective factors, or one of the two is simply a consequence of the accident. In this case we
may take into account just those occurrences that depend on a single factor and measure the
relevance proportionally to it.
These examples are just dierent ways to design a relevance measure. The adequate relevance
measure to use in each event P under analysis must be designed according to the objectives of
this analysis. For example, for the scenario 3 in Subsection 1.1, an \ad hoc" measure has
been dened to dierentiate between young and senior researchers. As a general comment,
we may say that the egalitarian measure, being a solidarity measure, attens the dierences
among the factors, so it may be used whenever the reliability of the data is extremely low; the
basic measure is suitable when the concurrency of the factors is negligible, i.e. any factor may
generate the outcome even alone; the fair measure is useful when all the set of factors and all the
factors in each set may be considered of equivalent weight; the selective measure emphasizes the
importance of just one factor for each set; the proportional measure is the most suitable when
the concurrency of more than one factor is viewed as a \noise", so it is preferable to ignore the
outcomes involving more than one factor. The practice and the knowledge of a manager may
allow dening more suitable measures.
Three aspects concerning relevant measures should be highlighted here:
First, relevance measures cover a wide spectrum of tools to be used for measuring the impor-
tance of factors. Depending on the policy that the evaluators (usually experts on the analyzed
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eld) seek, they will choose one measure or another. Measures can range from individualistic
criteria favoring the strongest factors to solidarity criteria (e.g., observe that the dierent mea-
sures adopted in the example in subsection 1.1, lead to dierent policies). This wide range of
possibilities is best reected at the end of section 3.
Second, once the measure is chosen by experts we want to emphasize that the only informa-
tion needed to compute them is the incidence function. This is an advantage with respect to
some alternative methods for measuring the importance of factors that use some extra data.
Third, these measures are easy to be computed. From the computational point of view, the
only limitation is the number of factors: whenever the incidence function is treatable most of
the chosen measures can be computed. In other words, the complexity of the problem uniquely
depends on the input data if the measure is dened by elementary operations, as it is the case
of all the particular measures considered in this paper.
2.2 Some properties for relevance measures
In this subsection we introduce two properties for factors and ve properties for relevance mea-
sures that will be used later.
Denition 2.8 Let a 2 AN .
 A factor i is null in a if a(S) = 0 for all S  N with i 2 S.
 Two dierent factors i and j have equivalent incidence in a if a(S [ fig) = a(S [ fjg) for
all S  N n fi; jg.
Denition 2.9 A relevance measures f satises the property of:
 Totality: if Pi2N fi(a) = T (a) for all a 2 AN .
 Zero on nulls: if fi(a) = 0 for any factor i null in a 2 AN .
 Equal treatment: if fi(a) = fj(a) for all pairs of factors i and j with equivalent incidence
in a 2 AN .
 Linearity: if fi(a+ b) = fi(a) + fi(b) for all ;  2 R; a; b 2 AN and for all i 2 N .
 Monotonicity: if a(S)  b(S) for all S  N;S 3 i implies fi(a)  fi(b) for all a; b 2 AN .
Linearity allows for weighted combinations of dierent incidence functions. For instance,
referring to the example in Subsection 1.1 we can make use of the publications in dierent
periods, with weights that allow to dierently account the various periods.
Monotonicity tells that if a factor i has larger incidence in function a than in function b,
then the relevance for factor i in function b should be at most the same as in function a.
In the following table we resume which of these properties are veried in the examples given
in the former subsection, leaving the proofs as an exercise for the reader.
Totality Zero on nulls Equal treatment Linearity Monotonicity
Egalitarian Yes No Yes Yes No
Basic No Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Fair Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted No* Yes No* Yes Yes
Selective Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Proportional Yes Yes Yes No No
Table 2: Some properties of relevance measures
In this table No* means that the property is veried or not depending on the considered
weights. Notice that there is only one of the former measures which veries all of these properties:
the fair relevance measure dened in Example 2.4. Similarly to our approach, properties and
characterization of risk measures by means of axioms is a common technique for risk measures
in insurance markets [33].
The properties we consider are not independent. In the following proposition we prove some
links among them.
Proposition 2.10 Let f be a relevance measure.
 If f veries Totality, Monotonicity and Equal treatment properties then it also veries
Zero on nulls property.
 If f veries Totality, Monotonicity and Equal treatment properties then it also veries
Linearity property.
3 The fair relevance measure
In this section we go deeper in the analysis of the fair relevance measure. The special interest
for this measure arises as it satises all the properties introduced in Subsection 2.2, and it seems
also very intuitive.
Apart of the interest of its properties, the fair measure is balanced and not biased in the
sense that it fully reects the concurrence of each factor in the event without favoring the most
relevant factors and non-being solidary with the least relevant factors.
Recall that the fair relevance measure was dened in Example 2.4 by:
Fi(a) =
X
SN : i2S
a(S)
jSj ; (2)
for each factor i 2 N and for any a 2 AN . The value Fi(a) is the result of adding up, for each
set S containing the factor i, the contribution of this factor i in a(S), assuming that all factors
in S have the same numerical assignment.
As was shown in Table 2, the fair relevance measure satises Totality, Zero on nulls, Equal
treatment, Linearity and Monotonicity properties. We see now that some of these properties
characterize this measure.
Proposition 3.1 There exists only one relevance measure that satises: Totality, Zero on nulls,
Equal treatment and Linearity properties. This measure is precisely the fair relevance measure.
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The four properties considered in Proposition 3.1 constitute aminimal characterization of the
fair relevance measure. To prove this minimality we show, for each one of these four properties,
an example, taken from Table 2, of relevance measure that satises the three other properties,
but not the property in question.
Example 3.2
 The basic measure b, dened in Example 2.3, satises Zero on nulls, Equal treatment and
Linearity but it does not verify Totality.
 The egalitarian measure e, dened in Example 2.2, satises Totality, Equal treatment and
Linearity, but it does not satisfy Zero on nulls.
 The selective measure s, dened in Example 2.6, satises Totality, Zero on nulls and
Linearity, but it does not satisfy Equal treatment.
 The proportional measure p, dened in Example 2.7, satises Totality, Zero on nulls and
Equal treatment, but it does not satisfy Linearity.
We can provide another more dicult characterization of the fair relevance measure.
Theorem 3.3 There exists only one relevance measure that satises: Totality, Equal treatment
and Monotonicity properties. This measure is precisely the fair relevance measure.
This previous theorem is an immediate consequence of Propositions 2.10 and 3.1.
The three properties considered in theorem 3.3 constitute another minimal characterization
of the fair relevance measure. To prove this minimality we show for each of these properties an
example that satises the two other properties, but not the property in question.
Example 3.4
 The basic measure b dened in Example 2.3 satises Equal treatment and Monotonicity,
but it does not verify Totality.
 The selective measure s dened in Example 2.6 satises Totality and Monotonicity but
it does not satisfy Equal treatment.
 The proportional measure p, dened in 2.7, satises Totality and Equal treatment but it
does not satisfy Monotonicity.
3.1 The fair measure seen under the viewpoint of cooperative game theory
Formally a cooperative game is a pair (N; v) where N is a nite set of players and v : 2N ! R
is the characteristic function, that assigns a real number v(S) to each coalition S  N , with
v(;) = 0. Thus an incidence function, as dened in subsection 1.2, can be viewed as a cooperative
game in which N , the set of players, admits a broader context in which players can be replaced
by factors, being possibly non-decision-makers, i.e., the factors act as `black boxes' with no
decision{making ability. This dierence becomes crucial.
Cooperative games have properties that encourage cooperation among players and from these
properties it results the problem of how to share the total amount raised among the players.
Three of these, non-independent properties are:
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 Monotonicity if v(S)  v(T ) for all S  T .
 Convexity if v(S [ T ) + v(S \ T )  v(S) + v(T ); for all S; T  N .
 Superadditivity if v(S [ T )  v(S) + v(T ) for all S; T  N such that S \ T = ;.
It is clear that if a game is convex then it is superadditive and monotonic. Thus, in a convex
cooperative game the rational decision-makers will form the grand coalition N and after they
will discuss how to divide the spoil v(N) among them. The most well-recognized one-point
solution that gives the answer to the second issue is the Shapley value.
On the other hand, it is clear that by its nature the incidence functions we are considering
are neither monotonic, nor convex, nor superadditive. To remedy this we may consider the
cumulative incidence function va regarded as a cooperative game, instead of a, where va(S)
counts the total number of occurrences of the event in which any combination of (not necessarily
all) factors in S concurred, but none of the factors in N n S, i.e.,
va(S) =
X
RS
a(R) for all S  N (3)
The correspondence between va and a is one{to{one since the determinant associated to the
equations system in (3) is 1, so we may derive va from a and conversely.
4
The next result proves that the cumulative incidence function va is convex and therefore
monotonic and supperadditive. Thus it has all the ingredients for taking the total amount
va(N) and dividing it among factors according to the Shapley value.
Proposition 3.5 Given any incidence function a 2 AN the function va dened in (3) is a
convex cooperative game.
Shapley [32] proved that there exists a unique function (value), on the set of cooperative
games having players' set N , which satises: Eciency, Null player, Symmetry and Linearity
(the Shapley value, ) which is given by
i(v) =
X
SNnfig
s!(n  s  1)!
n!
(v(S [ fig)  v(S)) (4)
where s = jSj and a value  for cooperative games is a function which assigns a real number
 i(v) to any game v and any player i 2 N . The four properties are the following.
 Eciency: Pi2N  i(v) = v(N) for any game v.
 Null player:  i(v) = 0 if v(S [ fig) = v(S) for all S  N n fig.
 Linearity:  i(v + w) =  i(v) +  i(w):
 Anonimity:  (i)((v)) =  i(v).
where we are assuming that i is any player in N , v; w any games on N and ;  any real
numbers), and  : N ! N a permutation that preserves the game, i.e. (v(S)) = v((S)) for
any S  N .
The following signicant relationship holds.
4a is derived from va by a(S) =
P
RS( 1)s rva(R) in which s = jSj and r = jRj.
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Proposition 3.6 Let F be the fair relevance measure (2) and  be the Shapley value (4) . Then,
F(a) = (va)
where va is the cumulative function dened from the incidence function a in (3).
This result tells us that the fair measure applied to an incidence function is nothing else than
the Shapley value applied to the associated cumulative incidence function va.
Considering the cumulative incidence function va is, in our context, less natural than using
the incidence function a. Moreover, we remark that it is preferable computing F to a than  to
va since our data is a and therefore we avoid the step of getting va from a. Additionally, the
formula to compute F is simpler than the one for  which is computationally intractable when
the number of factors is considerably high.
The relationship we have just established between the Fair relevance measure of an inci-
dence function and the Shapley value for the corresponding cumulative incidence function can
be extended to other relevance measures, in the sense that they correspond to other well{known
measures in cooperative game theory. For instance, it can easily be proved that the weighted
relevance measure (see denition 2.5) with c(i; S) =
1
2jSj 1
for all i 2 N and S  N corresponds
to the Banzhaf value (dened by Owen [30]) of the corresponding cumulative incidence function.
Also, the rst two measures proposed in scenario 2, in the introductory example of subsection
1.1, correspond to certain semivalues of the cumulative incidence function, and even the measure
proposed in scenario 3 corresponds to a probabilistic value of the cumulative incidence function.
However, this kind of relationship does not always exist: the third relevance measure consid-
ered in scenario 2 does not correspond to any probabilistic value for the cumulative incidence
function. In summary, many relevance measures considered in section 2 have their analogues in
game theory by considering the cumulative incidence function, but some other do not have this
correspondence.
Beyond game theory, our approach can be related to measures used in dierent elds such as
customer satisfaction ([7]), systems reliability ([19]) or medical research. For instance, two of the
measures considered in attributable risk analysis, the approach known in statistics for medical
research ([18], [17]), can also be seen from our point of view: the attributable risk (AR) and the
relative risk (RR). The AR measure for a risk factor i (ARi) is the probability of a member of a
population having the disease (P (D)) reduced by the probability of having the disease without
the risk factor (P (Dji )), relative to (P (D)):
ARi =
P (D)  P (Dji )
P (D)
= 1  P (Dji
 )
P (D)
and the RR measure for a risk factor i is dened as the number
RRi =
P (Dji+)
P (Dji )
where P (Dji+) is the probability of having the disease presenting the risk factor.
Both, AR and RR, are taken as additional measures for evaluating the importance of risk
factors in an event and are usually estimated, in empirical research, as proportions from the
sample data (see e.g. [7]). In our context, given the sample data, if we consider the incidence
function a which assigns to each subset S of the set N of selected risk factors the number of
times that all factors in the subset were present in a person having the disease, it would be
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natural to consider the two respective analogues for AR and RR, which are particular examples
of relevance measures for the risk factors:
AR0i = 1 
P
SN;i=2S
a(S)P
SN
a(S)
RR0i =
P
SN;i2S
a(S)P
SN;i=2S
a(S)
4 Two case studies involving risk factors
We introduce two cases of study involving sinistrality. In both situations the available informa-
tion taken from ocial reports just let us to build the incidence function a. As the fair relevance
measure is the only one that treats each occurrence of the event and also each factor equally, it
seems to be the relevance measure far better placed to be used. Although the following examples
just consider some few factors it should be noted that the number of factors could be very high.
For instance, in medicine it is an important problem to establish a ranking of importance among
genes causing a given cancer. Risk factors are genes provoking the illness and can be several
thousands, see e.g. [24].
4.1 Determining the importance of factors in trac accidents
Road trac deaths constitute a major public problem and are predicted to increase if road
safety is not addressed adequately. The appalling human misery and the serious economic loss
caused by road accidents demand the attention of the society and call for higher levels of safety.
Trac safety is usually regarded in terms of trac \unsafety", i.e., as the number of fatalities
or injuries resulting from trac accidents.
In the case study we present in this subsection we center our attention in ve factors in-
tervening in mortal road trac accidents (RTA) which, at the same time agglutinate several
subcases: (1) breaking trac laws (ignoring trac signals, safety belt not fastened, overtaking
when not allowed...), (2) driver's errors (overtaking without visibility, not being aware of ex-
ternal circumstances...), (3) inappropriate state of the driver (alcohol or drugs eects, illness,
distractions,...), (4) inadequate speed, (5) others (faulty state of the vehicle, faulty state of the
road, fortuitous unforeseeable external causes,...). The ve factors considered are the most rel-
evant ones mentioned in the annual statistic data of mortal RTA in Catalonia in 2009, where
concurrent factors were reported.
If N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g is the xed set of factors considered, then, for each mortal RTA (in the
context under analysis) we have a partition of N into two subsets S and N n S, understanding
that the factors in S were all present in the RTA and none of the elements in N n S intervened.
For instance, if S = f1; 3g is assigned to a particular RTA it means that breaking a trac
law and inappropriate state of the driver concurred in it, while the other three factors were
absent. Then, the incidence function corresponding to these data a : 2N ! R is such that a(S)
(for S 6= ;) gives the number of RTA occurred with the sole presence of (all factors of) S and
without the intervention of any factor in N n S. We assume a(;) = 0.5
5We do not count the RTA with no reported factor.
14
The incidence function a given by the collected data is the following:
a(f1g) = 1323; a(f2g) = 1432; a(f3g) = 1517; a(f4g) = 496; a(f5g) = 172;
a(f1; 2g) = 229; a(f1; 3g) = 176; a(f1; 4g) = 63; a(f1; 5g) = 68;
a(f2; 3g) = 0; a(f2; 4g) = 116; a(f2; 5g) = 60; a(f3; 4g) = 43;
a(f3; 5g) = 4; a(f4; 5g) = 74; a(f1; 2; 3g) = 44; a(f1; 2; 4g) = 0;
a(f1; 2; 5g) = 0; a(f1; 3; 4g) = 2; a(f1; 3; 5g) = 0; a(f1; 4; 5g) = 0;
a(f2; 3; 4g) = 0; a(f2; 3; 5g) = 0; a(f2; 4; 5g) = 0; a(f3; 4; 5g) = 0;
a(f1; 2; 3; 4g) = 0; a(f1; 2; 3; 5g) = 0; a(f1; 2; 4; 5g) = 0; a(f1; 3; 4; 5g) = 0;
a(f2; 3; 4; 5g) = 0; a(N) = 0:
The total number of accidents T (a) =
P
SN a(S) = 5819.
The computation of the proportional measure (see Denition 2.7) gives
p(a) = (1558:4; 1686:8; 1786:9; 584:3; 202:6);
while the basic measure (see Denition 2.3) is
b(a) = (1905; 1881; 1786; 794; 378);
and the fair measure (see Denition 2.4) gives
F(a) = (1606:3; 1649:2; 1643:8; 644:7; 275):
From these results we can derive several signicant considerations.
 The ranking of relevance given by the proportional measure p orders the ve factors as
follows: 3 > 2 > 1 > 4 > 5; the ranking of relevance given by the basic measure b
is: 1 > 2 > 3 > 4 > 5; and the ranking of relevance given by the fair measure F is:
2 > 3 > 1 > 4 > 5. Hence, the three rankings are dierent. Factor 2 turns up to
be more important than factor 3 for b and for F. Note that the proportional measure
wrongly tells that factor 3 is more relevant than factor 2. This is due to the fact that
the proportional measure disregards the mortal RTA with concurrence of several factors.
The basic measure ranks factor 1 as the most important because it is the most frequently
reported factor concurrent with others, although it is not the most frequent as a single
causer of an RTA.
 Assume that a budget has to be invested in actions addressed to prevent sinistrality.
How should this total amount be distributed in proportion to the factors that provoke
sinistrality? In our opinion, supported by the results given in previous sections, we would
give support to the distribution given by the fair relevance measure F. Unfortunately, the
proportional measures, which omits concurrence of several factors, is occasionally wrongly
taken.
 Assume, again, that for some reason it is decided that the budget is going to be invested in
actions addressed to prevent sinistrality related to just two factors. Which factors should
be chosen? In this situation, F would propose to share the total budget between factors 2
and 3 in an almost equal proportion.
If accidents police reports just provide contributing factors in each accident in binary form
(either yes or no) as is the case, little more can be done to calculate the incidence function and
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compute for it a reasonable relevance measure for it. Of course, if we had more information this
should be incorporated in our model and treat the problem in a dierent way.
Independence of factors is another signicant issue, however there exist some literature of
several techniques for the Shapley value (see, e.g. [11] and [26]) which can be adapted to our
context, but this is out of our scope in this paper.
4.2 Determining the importance of factors in mining accidents
Decisions in mining safety management are typically about actions (interventions, projects,
regulations, standards, programs, etc.) that involve the expenditure of money to reduce the toll
of accidents. The central feature of such decisions is that they are made by few on behalf of
many. To have legitimacy one must be able to claim that what the few decide is what the many
give their consent to.
The data in this section are obtained from the \Ministerio de Industria, Energa y Minera"
and correspond to all mining accidents occurred in Spain between 1982 and 2006. The cod-
ication used to describe the factors (in this context they are called events) intervening in a
particular accident is the one recommended by experts in mining safety [8], and is described for
this particular case in [31].
For each accident, a sequence of up to three temporally ordered events, that immediately
preceded it, are reported. They are called precursor events. All precursor events are classied
by two complementary characteristics: the type of event and the temporal order in which they
occurred. This last characteristic is called the precursor level of the event, and can be 1, 2 or
3, meaning that all events of level 1 took place before of the events of level 2, and these ones
happened before the ones of level 3. In this way we obtain the following classication:
1. Environmental events: events referring to the location of the accident (e.g., low lighting,
wet oor, or cramped conditions). Denoted by V1, V2, or V3, depending on their precursor
level.
2. Equipment events: events resulting from breakage or malfunction of machinery or tools.
Denoted by E1, E2, or E3.
3. Medical events: events resulting from the person's current state of physical well-being
(e.g., heart attack or diabetic or epileptic episode). Denoted by M1, M2, or M3.
4. Behavioral events: events resulting directly from human involvement (e.g. learning too
far into the path of machinery, touching an electrically charged object). Denoted by B1,
B2, or B3.
Let N be the nite set of precursor events. The cardinality of N is 12 and its elements are:
fV 1; V 2; V 3; E1; E2; E3;M1;M2;M3; B1; B2; B3g
Let a : 2N ! R be the incidence function such that a(S) gives the number of mining accidents
that have occurred in Spain during the analysis period with the sole presence of all the events in
S, i.e., without the intervention of any element of N n S. If T is the total number of accidents,
we have X
i2S
a(S) = T:
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Some subsets of N technically have null incidence. Indeed, a(S) = 0 whenever the cardinality
of S is greater than 3 (recall that at most three precursor events are reported for each accident),
or whenever S contains an event of the same type in more than one precursor level, e.g. the
subset S = fV 1; E2; V 3g cannot have positive incidence. If only one event occurred in an
accident, it must obviously be the \rst" one so that subsets like S = fV 2g or S = fV 3g are not
possible. Similarly, if two events occurred in an accident they must be consecutively the \rst"
and the \second" but never the third, e.g. subset S = fV 1; B3g is neither possible. Finally, we
also assume the technical requirement that a(;) = 0, i.e. if no event is known for an accident,
something that occurs two times in our data, we do not count this accident. The total number
of accidents taken into account is T = 242.
As the cardinality of the set of events N is 12 there are in principle 212 = 4096 subsets to
take into consideration, but if we discard the ones with null incidence explained above, we only
need to consider 40 subsets with potential non-null accident incidence. We do not reproduce
here the values of the incidence function a on these 40 subsets, but using the fair relevance
measure we obtain the following result (relevance of each event in N):
V1 V2 V3 E1 E2 E3 M1 M2 M3 B1 B2 B3 Total
93.83 4.33 0.67 22.33 4.67 1.00 67.83 42.00 4.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 242
Rescaling the data to one hundred we have the percentages of relevance of each event.
V1 V2 V3 E1 E2 E3 M1 M2 M3 B1 B2 B3 Percentage
38.77 1.79 0.28 9.23 1.93 0.41 28.03 17.40 1.65 0.41 0.00 0.14 100
Four events protrude above the other events:
V 1 > M1 > M2 > E1 > others
In particular these four events represent more than the 93% of the total relevance. Thus, any
eort to prevent future sinistrality should mainly be addressed to these four events.
If we do not make distinctions among the ordering of occurrence of events and only consider
the four general types: V , E, M and B, understanding that V agglutinates V 1, V 2 and V 3.
Then
V E M B Total
98.83 28.00 113.83 1.33 242
Note that while clearly V 1 > M1, the opposite M > V holds. This is because V 1=V is close
to 1, which means that event V rarely intervenes as a second or third temporarily event, and
also because M is mainly distributed between M1 and M2.
As we have seen, experts on mining have grouped risks into these four categories although
there exists a large sublist of factors within behavioral events for which our computation can be
extended. This form of grouping factors is common in civil engineering, according to [5] more
than 500 risk issues related to dierent stages in tunnel projects are identied. Nevertheless,
some of them (six reported in [5]) represent the ones that were most frequently selected by
experts as being major risks during construction.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a game theoretic approach for analyzing the importance of factors
in the occurrences of an event. We suppose that, for each subset of factors, the number of
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occurrences of the event in which exactly these factors intervened is known. This available
dataset is expressed by an incidence function. We provide adequate measures to evaluate the
relevance of each factor in the occurrence of an event, that can be used for dierent policies in
order to improve future repetitions of the event. We introduce some properties, analyze some
relationship among them and mention similarities with measures in other contexts. Dierent
relevance measures can be used depending on the problem under analysis and on the pursued
goals. A part from the ones dened in Section 2, the experience and expertise of a manager
may suggest further less intuitive but more appropriate measures, accounting also the situation
at hand and the scope of the study.
We theoretically highlight a measure that treats equally all occurrences of the event and
also all factors, the fair relevance measure. We relate it with a well-known value for cooperative
games, the Shapley value, and show how this measure can be applied to situations involving risk
factors in two types of accidents: road trac and mining. The Shapley value for cooperative
games is well established and accepted. If we had to select the greatest criticism that has
received we would choose that it does not favor solidarity among the decision-makers. This is
reected in the rst scenario of our initial example, in which the young researcher is treated as
the other (senior) researchers. In our context we mainly have factors dierent from people thus,
why should solidarity be an important issue? In our view the Shapley value is reinforced in the
context considered in the paper.
Throughout the paper, we supposed that the factors are independent, but sometimes this
hypothesis may result too strong. More precisely, it is possible that factors considered inde-
pendent are connected in practice. Game theory oers a tool for facing these situations. We
may refer to [26] where a situation of correlation among genes is analysed (see also [28] and
[11]). In particular, they consider a game where the players are the genes that are supposed
fully independent and their importance as markers of a disease is evaluated via the Shapley
Value [32]. Following the approach in [29] a graph is added, in order to emphasize the existing
relationships among the genes, and again their importance is evaluated via the Myerson Value.
The dierence between the Shapley Value and the Myerson Value assigned to the genes gives
a measure of the centrality (see [16]) of the genes in the network and may be interpreted as a
measure of their interdependence.
Possible future developments may look for exploiting the cooperative game introduced in
Section 3 for analyzing possible dependencies among the factors. Another interesting direction
is represented by those situations in which several factors are identied, so that the number
of possible subsets increases and it may become dicult to manage the incidence function,
so we can study the possibility of using approximated measures. A third situation that may
deserve further investigation may show up when we consider many factors, and consequently the
reliability of the data is questionable, as it is possible that not all the factors involved may be
identied with enough certainty. In these cases it may be useful to use a subset of the available
data, e.g. only those related to occurrences that are caused by at most two factors.
From a theoretical viewpoint it would be interesting to extend Proposition 3.6 of this paper
and its following remarks by studying possible relationships between the class of weighted rele-
vance measures (Example 2.5) and some well-known one-point solution concepts in cooperative
game theory.
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6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.10
First, note that:
a(S) = b(S) for all S  N; S 3 i implies fi(a) = fi(b) (5)
for a; b 2 AN . In fact, by monotonicity:
a(S) = b(S) for all S  N; S 3 i) a(S)  b(S) for all S  N; S 3 i) fi(a)  fi(b)
and
a(S) = b(S) for all S  N; S 3 i) a(S)  b(S) for all S  N; S 3 i) fi(a)  fi(b)
so, fi(a) = fi(b)
 Consider the null incidence function  dened as (S) = 0 for all S  N . Then by equal
treatment we have that fi() = fj() for all i; j 2 N: By totality
P
i2N fi() = T () = 0,
and therefore fi() = 0 for all i 2 N .
Let a 2 AN . Now by (5) it follows that for any null factor i 2 N :
a(S) = 0 = (S) for all S  N; i 2 S implies fi(a) = fi() = 0 (6)
Hence, we have shown that the Zero on nulls property holds.
 Write the incidence function a in its standard basis form a = PSN :S 6=; a(S)aS . Dene
the index I associated to a as the number of non-zero terms in the decomposition of the
incidence function a, i.e. I = jISj, where IS = fS  N : a(S) 6= 0g = fS1; S2; :::; SIg.
Clearly, 0  I  2n   1. W.l.o.g. we may consider 1  I  2n   1 as for I = 0 then
IS = ;, or equivalently a =  for which Linearity trivially holds. We prove the assertion
by induction on the set IS.
IS = fRg. Then I = 1 and a = CaR, i.e.,
a(S) =

C; if S = R
0; otherwise
We distinguish two situations:
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{ i =2 R. We have a(S) = 0 for all S  N;S 3 i, i.e. i is a null factor, and thus by Zero
on nulls property fi(a) = 0. Hence,
0 = fi(a) = fi
0@ X
SN :S 6=;
a(S)aS
1A
On the other hand:X
SN :S 6=;
a(S)fi(aS) =
X
SN :S 6=R;S 6=;
a(S)fi(aS) + a(R)fi(aR) =
X
SN :S 6=R;S 6=;
0fi(aS) + C0
and Linearity holds.
{ i 2 R. For all j 2 R Equal treatment implies that fj(a) = fi(a). Combined with
totality this implies that fi(a) =
C
jRj , but also fi(aR) =
1
jRj . Thus,
C
jRj = fi(a) = fi
0@ X
SN :S 6=;
a(S)aS
1A
On the other hand:P
SN :S 6=;
a(S)fi(aS) =
P
SN :S 6=R;S 6=;
a(S)fi(aS) + a(R)fi(aR)
=
P
SN :S 6=R;S 6=;
0  fi(aS) + C  1jRj =
C
jRj
and Linearity holds.
Assume the assertion holds for I; prove it holds for I = I + 1.
Assume that Linearity holds for any b 2 AN : b = PIk=1 b(Sk)aSk . Let a 2 AN : a =PI+1
k=1 a(Sk)aSk , i.e. the other elements of a(S) are zero, and let IS
+ = fS1; S2; :::; SI+1g.
Let R = \I+1k=1Sk.
Suppose that i =2 R.
Consider the incidence function
a =
X
Sk2IS+ :Sk3i
a(Sk)aSk
Then a has an index of at most I with regard to i =2 R. Furthermore,
a(S) = a(S) for all S  N; i 2 S:
Thus by induction hypothesis and monotonicity, it can be concluded that
fi(a) = fi(a) =
P
Sk2IS+ :Sk3i
a(Sk)fi(aSk)
=
P
Sk2IS+ :Sk3i
a(Sk)fi(aSk) +
P
Sk2IS+ :Sk 63i
a(Sk)fi(aSk)
=
PI+1
k=1 a(Sk)fi(aSk)
where the third equality holds because fi(aSk) = 0; Sk 2 IS+ : Sk 63 i.
Next suppose that i 2 R.
By Equal treatment, fi(a) is a constant c for all factors in R. By equal treatment and
totality fi(aS) = 1=jSj for all S  N , i 2 S.
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By totality and because a(S) = 0 if R * S:X
i2R
fi(a) +
X
i=2R
fi(a) =
X
SN
a(S) =
X
RSN
a(S)
Thus,
cjRj+
X
RSN
jSj   jRj
jSj a(S) +
X
RSN
a(S)
Hence,
fi(a) = c =
X
RSN
a(S)
jSj =
X
SN;i2S
a(S)
1
jSj =
X
SN;i2S
a(S)fi(aS)

Proof of Proposition 3.1
Existence: It is obvious that F satises the four stated properties.
Uniqueness: For any set S (S 6= ;) of factors let us consider the basic incidence function aS
that counts one accident for only the set of factors S:
aS(R) =
8<:
0 if R 6= S
1 if R = S
Now each a can be written as:
a =
X
SN :S 6=;
a(S)  aS
Taking into account totality, zero on nulls and equal treatment it follows that the value of f
for aS is
fi(aS) =
8>><>>:
1
jSj if i 2 S
0 if i =2 S
and therefore, from linearity property it follows that
fi(a) =
X
SN :i2S
a(S)
jSj
Thus, fi(a) = Fi(a) for all i 2 N and a 2 AN . Hence, f = F. 
Proof of Proposition 3.5
To see that the game va is convex, rst note that the value of va(S [ T ) + va(S \ T ) can be
expressed by:X
RS[T
a(R) +
X
RS\T
a(R) =
X
RS
a(R) +
X
R  T :
R \ (T   S) 6= ;
a(R) +
X
R  S [ T :
ST  R
a(R) +
X
RS\T
a(R)
where ST = (S T )[ (T  S) is the symmetric dierence. On the other hand, the expression
va(S) + va(T ) can be written:X
RS
a(R) +
X
RT
a(R) =
X
RS
a(R) +
X
RS\T
a(R) +
X
R  T :
R \ (T   S) 6= ;
a(R)
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Thus, the expression va(S [ T ) + va(S \ T )  va(S) + va(T ) can be simplied to:X
R  S [ T :
ST  R
a(R)  0;
that holds by the non-negativity of the incidence function a. 
Proof of Proposition 3.6 First note that
va(S [ fig)  va(S) =
X
TS
a(T [ fig) for all S  N n fig
Thus,
i[va] =
X
SNnfig
24 X
TNnfig :ST
n(t)
35 a(S [ fig)
where jT j = t and n(t) = 1=[n
 
n 1
t

]. Let  n(s) be the coecient of a(S [ fig) in the latter
expression, i.e.,
 n(s) =
X
TNnfig :ST
n(t) for all S  N n fig
To see that i[va] coincides with Fi[a] we need to prove that  n(s) = 1=(s + 1) for all s =
0; 1; : : : ; n  1. We proceed by induction on s.
Assume s = 0. Then  n(0) =
Pn 1
k=0
 
n 1
k

n(k) =
Pn 1
k=0 1=n = 1.
Assume that  n(s) = 1=(s + 1), we need to prove that  n(s + 1) = 1=(s + 2). We express
 n(s+ 1) as a function of  n(s) in the following way:
 n(s+ 1) =  n(s) +B(s)  n(s)
where
B(s) =
n 2 sP
k=1
 
n 2 s
k 1
   n 1 sk  (s+ k)
=
(n  2  s)!
n!
n 2 sP
k=1

(s+ k)!(k   n+ 1 + s)
k!

has a known sum, so that:
B(s)  n(s) =   1
(s+ 1)(s+ 2)
and by induction hypothesis, i.e.,  n(s+ 1) = 1=(s+ 1)  1=((s+ 1)(s+ 2)) = 1=(s+ 2). 
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